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The idea of corporate culture has recently generated widespread interest 
and attention from both professional practitioners and organizational re-
searchers.! These writers have studied and hypothesized about issues includ-
ing the origins of culture, its dissemination within organizations, its man-
agement, and how to achieve cultural change. The purpose of this paper is to 
propose a potentially useful way for classifying cultures based on a study of 
their reward systems. According to Trice and Beyer, corporate cultures have 
two basic components: (1) their substance, consisting of the network of mean-
ings contained in their values and norms, and (2) their forms, consisting of 
the practices whereby cultural meanings are communicated to organization mem-
bers.2 Our underlying premise is that an organization's reward system repre-
sents an essential form through which the organization communicates the sub-
stance of its culture. By articulating desired behaviors and attitudes, the 
reward system communicates its culture to new members and affirms its culture 
for older ones. The reward system thus functions as a primary instrument for 
acculturation and control by transmitting values and norms to its members. By 
studying the values embedded within reward systems, we believe basic similari-
ties and differences in corporate cultures can be categorized and compared. 
THE CONCEPT OF CULTURE 
The concept of culture has been defined and applied in a wide variety of 
settings. A number of disciplines have found it useful in understanding the 
behavior of people in social settings. Within this diverse literature, we 
have been able to identify three elements common to definitions of culture. 
First, it seems widely agreed that culture consists primarily of a set of 
cognitive reference points. Aggregated, these reference points form a frame-
work within which organization members can interpret and attribute meaning to 
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their own behavior, the behavior of their group or organization, and to envi-
ronmental events. Sathe describes culture as a group's shared understandings 
or assumptions about the world and how it works.3 Pettigrew views culture as 
a system of publicly and collectively accepted meanings operating for a social 
group at a given point in time.4 Following Sethia and Von Glinow, we define 
culture as the shared and relatively enduring pattern of values, beliefs and 
assumptions that allows people to attribute meaning to an otherwise meaning-
less flow of events.S 
Second, this system of meaning gives rise to a network of values, norms, 
and behavioral expectations that simultaneously derives from and supports a 
culture. As Louis has pointed out, corporate culture provides a vehicle for 
an organization's continuity, control, identity, and integration.6 The sta-
bility of shared values across generations of organizational participants pro-
vides continuity and serves a homeostatic function. This stability also 
serves to detect and control deviance from the commonly-held set of organiza-
tional beliefs. 
Third, cultures are expressed through a variety of symbolic, interper-
sonal, and structural manifestations. These include a group's internal lan-
guage or jargon,7 rituals and ceremonial events,8 metaphors,9 stories and 
legends,lO and its formal structure.ll Because these are visible artifacts of 
culture, they are the means by which culture is transmitted to members. They 
are also considered to ~ leverage points through which a culture can be modi-
fied by managers.12 
REWARD SYSTEMS AS EXPRESSIONS OF CULTURE 
Many of the above mentioned artifacts of culture can be traced -to the 
_ practices by which rewards are allocated within a group or organization. 
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Kilmann, Schein, and others have argued that much of the substance of culture 
is concerned with the relationship between the organization and the individ-
ual.l3 Reward systems articulate this relationship by structuring the terms 
of exchange.l4 On the one hand, the reward system expresses the values and 
norms to which those in the organization are expected to conform. On the 
other hand, it expresses the organizational response individuals can expect to 
receive based on their behaviors. Kilmann argues that culture is an expres-
sion of what the organization values and which aspects of performance are 
critical to an individual's "getting ahead."l5 Implicit in the notion of cul-
ture, in other words, is the idea of performance criteria and contingent re-
wards, the essential elements of any reward system. Reward systems serve as a 
guide to an organization's culture first, by specifying the contributions ex-
pected from members, and second, by specifying the inducements offered by the 
organization. 
There are numerous examples of the interdependence between cultures and 
reward systems. Lawler notes that reward systems lead to perceptions and be-
liefs about what an organization stands for, believes in, and values.l6 Thus, 
the well-known pink cadillacs and mink coats used by Mary Kay to reward top 
performers are ceremonial rituals that vividly express the company's optimis-
tic, achieving culture. The highly quantitative and precise performance mea-
surement system at Pepsico is an equally clear expression of that firm's com-
petitive and aggressive culture. By contrast, the paternalistic, "family"-
like cultures of such organizations as J. C. Penney and United Press Interna-
tional are accurately captured in reward systems that pay off for loyalty, 
tenure, and conformity to norms rather than for financial results. While 
there may be a gap between an organization's publicly espoused values and 
those that actually operate on a daily basis, organization members are rarely 
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misled. The reward system - who gets rewarded and why - represents an un-
equivocal statement of the ~organization's true values and culture. 
In addition, we recognize that a large corporation with divisions in sev-
eral different businesses, such as W. R. Grace or Gulf & Western, may have 
multiple reward systems. While these reward systems might share some funda-
mental philosophies and values across divisions, each division may need to 
have a somewhat different reward sys'tem to fit its unique setting, business 
strategy, and product's life cycle. This raises the possibility of multiple 
reward systems supporting multiple cultures or subcultures within an organiza-
tion. 
Subcultures are a natural byproduct of the tendency of organizations to 
differentiate. As organizations grow with respect to the number of products, 
services, and divisions, subcultures can emerge that reflect a number of dis-
tinct work and social environments. Through increasing differentiation, op-
portunity for the emergence of countercultures is also increased. Countercul-
T tures are shared values and beliefs tha~ are in direct conflict with the pat-
terns of the dominant culture. To the extent that the organization's reward 
· system reinforces these distinct behavioral norms and belief systems, subcul-
tures and countercultures are likely to be articulated and even nurtured. 
The close interdependence of reward systems and cultures means that ma-
nipulation of rewards provides a mechanism for effecting culture change. Re-
ward systems are especially useful in this role because they can be designed 
to express both the direction and intensity of behaviors desired by top man-
agement.l7 We would predict that a consensus regarding the organization's re-
ward system would itself promote some sharing of beliefs and behavioral pat-
terns. For consensus to lead to a high level of shared beliefs and behaviors, 
a strong connection between expectations, rewards, and behaviors must exist. 
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METHOD 
To explore the relationship between corporate cultures and reward systems 
in detail, we studied the reward systems of 14 companies in the northeast and 
midwest regions of the United States. All but one of the companies were in-
cluded in Fortune's listing of the top 500 corporations for 1981. Sales 
ranged from $125 million to over $8 billion. The companies ranged from 
single-product industrial firms to multi-divisional conglomerates. 
Initial contact in each firm was made with the ranking human resource 
manager. These individuals participated as key informants and provided the 
names and titles of other managers in their firms who might be willing to par-
ticipate. To insure the selection of knowledgeable managers, we asked that 
only persons who had been with the company for at least five years and had 
participated in the distribution of rewards (e.g., salary increases, bonuses, 
perquisites) be included. In addition, at least one mana~er in each firm was 
of sufficient rank to be responsible for making reward allocation decisions 
regarding subordinates. In other words, both sides of the reward relation-
ship, manager and subordinate, were represented in the sample. 
In all, 75 interviews with high-level managers were conducted. The in-
terviews lasted from one hour in length to as long as five or six hours. The 
average interview was approximately 90 minutes long and took place in the man-
ager's office. We interviewed on average 5 managers from each firm, with as 
many as 10 managers in one firm. The interviewee group included five chief 
executive officers, seven group-level executives, five line vice presidents 
(manufa~turing, production), six staff vice presidents, 25 division general 
managers, and 27 director-level managers. 
Initial interviews in each firm concentrated on gathering objective data 
on the managerial reward system. These focused on performance definition and 
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evaluation, feedback processes, and the administration of rewards (bonus, 
salary, stock, perquisites, and promotion). These interviews were structured 
in order to obtain comparable data from each firm. Later interviews concen-
trated on gathering subjective data on the firm's history, founders or domi-
nant leaders, traditions, values, and norms. These interviews were necessari-
ly open-ended and exploratory. 
In addition to interview data, company documents, such as annual reports, 
10-K reports and company histories (when available) were also examined. Some 
firms were able to provide documentation on the reward system itself. The 10-
K and annual reports served as a basis for providing the researchers with an 
overview of the firm's products, corporate and business strategy, and past 
economic performance. The company histories provided insight into the origins 
of the firm, including their stated values and traditions. Data from these 
sources served as a check on the information gathered through the 
interviews.18 
REWARD SYSTEMS 
From these key informant interviews, two distinct reward systems emerged: 
the hierarchy-based system and performance-based system. The reward systems 
in eight firms were classified as hierarchy-based and six were classified as 
performance-based. The descriptions of each of these reward systems and the 
cultures embedded within them are presented below. It should be noted that 
these descriptions of reward systems and cultures are composites that repre-
sent "pure" types. Actual systems and cultures exhibited distinctive varia-
tions but conformed to the general types described below. 
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The Hierarchy-Based Reward System 
In hierarchy-based reward systems, the influence of superiors in defining 
and evaluating the performance of subordinate managers was paramount. Perfor-
mance was defined qualitatively as well as quantitatively. Nonquantifiable 
aspects of the subordinate's role were sometimes considered to be more impor-
tant than quantifiable ones. Superiors were free to emphasize those aspects 
of the managers' role they believed to be important. Working under one supe-
rior could entail emphasizing a different set of factors than working for 
another. 
Manager's jobs were broadly and subtly defined. Managers were account-
able for how they managed their interpersonal relationships as well as the 
consequences of their actions. Numbers (e.g., ROI) did not tell the whole 
story and more subtle aspects of performance were sometimes viewed as the most 
important. Superiors were critical to subordinate managers' career mobility 
and succsess with the firm. Superiors were the source of training, socializa-
tion, feedback, and rewards. They were to be studied, emulated, and satisfied 
if subordinates expected to succeed. 
Superiors interpreted the performance of subordinates according to their 
own subjective criteria. Even in quantified areas of subordinates' roles, su-
periors did not hesitate to interpret numerical outcomes in the context of 
their own knowledge of the situation. Factors such as interdivisional cooper-
ation, long-term relations with customers, leadership style, and development 
of junior managers were evaluated despite obvious difficulties in quantifying 
them. This type of evaluation communicated the importance of the hierarchy 
and the subordinate's dependence on superiors. The subjective nature of 
evaluation allowed for the inclusion of qualitative performance criteria and 
reinforced the message that a manager must be concerned with more than just 
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the numbers. Subjective evaluation permitted consideration of the long-term 
consequences of managerial action. This implied an ongoing commitment to the 
activity or business in question. 
Formal performance appraisals took place once a year. Informal feedback, 
however, was quite frequent. There was a high level of interaction between 
superiors and subordinates. Feedback occurred on the job, in the dining room, 
during executive retreats, or at the country club. Feedback was oriented more 
towards employee development than towards evaluation. Performance definition 
and evaluation were subjective and, therefore, the quality of a subordinate's 
performance could only be known through superiors. The high level of interac-
tion coupled with a developmental approach communicated the organization's 
commitment to the individual's success and future. This was conducive to men-
taring relationships and to extensive socialization of younger managers. The 
sense of dependency and vulnerability to the judgments of superiors was 
balanced by a message of concern for the individual as a valued resource whose 
development was important to the organization. 
A manager's bonus was based on corporate performance. The system re-
warded the team, not the individual manager. All gained or lost together. 
This promoted a sense of reciprocal interdependence and provided a basic ra-
tionale for cooperative rather than competitive behavior. The fact that po-
tential bonus payouts increased with hierarchical level emphasized the impor-
tance of long-term commitment to the organization (tenure was a precondition 
for promotion) and conformity to its norms. Bonus was a relatively small pro-
portion of total compensation, ranging from 20 to 30%, while salary was the 
largest part of a manager's compensation. By severely limiting potential 
bonus for the indi_vidual star, the system removed the incentive for behaviors 
that benefited single managers rather than the entire organization. The bonus 
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system reinforced the subordinate's dependence on superiors' judgment because 
superiors determined appropriate bonus amounts. 
Salary increases were generally determined through a formal salary plan 
such as the Hay system. The two major factors influencing the size of a sal-
ary increase were tenure (time in grade) and performance (subjective evalua-
tion by superiors). The tenure component provided structure to the salary in-
crease decision. Policies specified the range of possible increases within 
the job classifications. 
Perquisites were even more constrained by policy than were raises. 
Available perquisites were not necessarily elaborate. Those that existed, 
however, were carefully policed. Status symbols, such as location of offices, 
furniture, club memberships, first-class travel, etc., were considered impor-
tant symbols of rank. Superiors sometimes insisted that managers use them 
even in cases where the individual did not want them. While perquisites them-
selves symbolized rank and power for those that had them, the careful policing 
of perquisites conveyed information about the importance of rank, tenure, and 
commitment. It communicated a sense of ritual and tradition. Receiving a 
particular type of desk upon promotion, being told (not asked) to join a pres-
tigious men's club because everyone of a given rank had always done so, being 
met at airports by local managers, were all rituals that told members about 
the symbolic meaning of perquisites. They communicated a sense of tradition, 
history and uniqueness. Even for those not eligible for such perquisites, the 
fact that they existed provided a feeling of belonging not simply to an eco-
nomic entity, but to a social and cultural system. 
In contrast to perquisites, stock awards were not structured in any obvi-
ous way. Managers had little knowledge about how or why awards were made. 
Awards were not directly related to individual or even corporate performance. 
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Generally, the higher the managerial rank, the greater the eligibility for 
stock awards. The absence of information about stock awards left subordinates 
with no understanding of these rewards or how to influence their distribution. 
The lack of clarity imparted a sense of mysterious ritual to the reward. 
Again, the message was that subordinates must trust superiors to do the right 
thing. Receiving stock awards symbolized acceptance into some inner circle. 
Therefore, managers had to be highly cognizant of deviations from the total 
set of values and norms operating in the company. Since the basis for stock 
awards was not understood, any deviation might be serious enough to reduce or 
temporarily eliminate the reward for a manager. 
Promotion from within was the standard policy. Promotions were relative-
ly frequent (every two to four years) and were often motivated more by the in-
dividual's need for development (i.e., exposure to new areas) than by the or-
ganization's need to fill a slot. Many of these promotions did not entail 
s i gnificant increases in authority, responsibility, or salary. Commitment to 
employee development and cross-fertilization resulted in lateral or diagonal 
movement rather than vertical movement for many managers. There was a strong 
·norm regarding "cross-fertilization" in most companies. Managers were rou-
tinely transferred across division or functional boundaries in keeping with 
the emphasis on management development. 
A norm of promotion from within provided a strong signal to members that 
the organization valued long-term commitment. These promotions symbolized 
that the organization was a place where a member could pursue a lifetime 
career. This was a central clause within the implicit social contract all 
things being equal, an individual would not be passed over for someone who had 
not paid dues to the organization. It expressed a high regard fo~ the 
already-socialized member. 
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The practice of cross-fertilization and freQuent lateral movement ex-
pressed concern for the development of employees. These practices communi-
cated concern that the individual was learning about the organization and that 
his or her progress and success was important. Promotions of this type con-
tributed to a tight, homogeneous organization with common language, experi-
ence, and values. Lack of movement signaled a disinvestment in the individual 
and a loss of interest on the part of the organization. 
The hierarchy-based reward system, summarized in Table 1, expressed a 
number of fundamental cultural tenets. First, this reward system provided an 
Insert Table 1 About Here 
unequivocal signal that hierarchical position was the source of 'power, re-
sources, information, and rewards. The hierarchy structured or~anized activi-
ty and provided the context within which social interaction took place. Sec-
ond, virtually all aspects of the reward system -- from the definition and 
measurement of performance to the actual determination of rewards -- was pred-
icated on the perceptions, knowledge, and judgment of superiors. Superiors 
were the key to an individual's development, promotion, and eventual success 
in the organization. Third, the hierarchy-based reward system gave clear sig-
nals about the value of conformity. Conforming to the dominant philosophy and 
managerial style was important. The qualitative and subjective nature of the 
system communicated that conformity was also expected over a wide range of 
both obvious and subtle behaviors. 
Fourth, the reward system expressed the value of reciprocal interdepen-
dence. Rewards based on group rather than individual performance promoted 
feelings of a shared fate. Frequent cross-divisional movement ti~htened orga-
nizational ties by creating a network of personal relationships. Promotions 
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from within and carefully policed perquisites fostered a sense of belonging to 
a unique and cohesive group. Finally, the reward system expressed the value 
of long-term commitment. All classes of rewards increased with rank and 
tenure. The reward system expressed the organization's commitment to the in-
dividual through promotion from within, cross-fertilization, and an emphasis 
on employee development. 
The Clan Culture 
The kind of culture that emerged from the hierarchy-based reward systems 
may be characterized as a clan. Ouchi19 has used the term clan to describe a 
control system based on socialization and internalized values and norms. 
Table 2 summarizes the major features of the clan culture. In this culture, 
the relationship between the individual and the organization is analogous to a 
Insert Table 2 About Here 
fraternal group. Each recognizes .an obligation to the other that goes beyond 
the simple exchange of labor for salary. It ·is tacitly understood by both 
parties that either may require contributions that exceed any contractual 
agreements. The individual's long-term commitment to the organization 
(loyalty) is exchanged for the organization's long-term commitment to the in-
dividual (security). This relationship is predicated on mutual interests: 
the fate of the collective equates with the fate of the individual. 
The clan culture accomplishes this unity through a long and thorough so-
cialization process. Members progress through the ranks by pursuing tradi-
tiona! ~areer paths in the company. Older members of the clan serve as men-
tors and role models for younger members. It is through these relationships 
that the values and norms of the firm are maintained over successive genera-
tions of managers. The clan is aware of its unique history, often documenting 
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its origins and celebrating its traditions in various ceremonies. Statements 
of its credo or publicly-held values are reinforced at these meetings. Mem-
bers share a picture of the organization's "style," its manner of conduct. 
Attitudinal and behavioral expectations exist for a broad range of situations 
and activities. 
In the clan culture, members share a sense of pride in the fraternity and 
in membership. The socialization process results in strong identification be-
tween members and a strong sense of interdependence. The up-through-the-ranks 
career pattern results in an extensive network of colleagues whose paths have 
crossed and who have shared similar experiences. Communication, coordination, 
and integration are facilitated by shared goals, perceptions, and behavioral 
tendencies. 
There is also considerable pressure to conform. The very richness of the 
culture means there are few areas left totally free from normative pressures. 
Whether or not fully socialized members experience these pressures as obnox-
ious, the culture does not usually generate risk-taking or creative initia-
tives. It also does not generate a feeling of personal ownership on the part 
of members for a division, product, or idea. For this and other reasons, the 
culture is not conducive to entrepreneurial activity. 
The Performance-Based Reward System 
Other firms exhibited another type of reward system. This system defined 
and measured performance objectively and explicitly linked rewards to perfor-
mance. In many ways, it was the polar opposite of the hierarchy-based system. 
Performance was defined almost completely in terms of quantitative criteria. 
Qualitative aspects of performance were generally ignored. Specific rewards 
or proportions of rewards were linked directly to specific performance cri-
teria (e.g., X% of bonus based on return on assets, Y% of bonus on pretax 
profits, etc.). In this way, superior managers exerted influence by objec-
tively weighting the various components of the subordinate's job. 
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This reward system conveyed that the manager's job was specifically de-
fined. A manager's divergent roles were coalesced into a few basic financial 
outcomes. Accountability was primarily for results, and not for the methods 
by which results were achieved. The message was that the numbers (e.g., ROI, 
market share) were all important. Evaluations were frequently based on a for-
mula with the manager's financial results serving as inputs. Nonquantifiable 
aspects of performance were generally not evaluated. Because of the quantita-
tive emphasis, performance evaluation necessarily focused on the current time 
frame with little consideration of future consequences. 
This type of evaluation communicated to managers their independence from 
the subjective judgments of their supedors. Superiors had few channels 
through which to express their concern for stylistic aspects of their sub-
ordinates' performance. The system clearly told managers to focus on those 
performance elements that could be quantified. Because activities that con-
tribute to long-run competitiveness are sometimes difficult to quantify, this 
system signaled that such activities were not formally part of the reward 
equation. 
Performance feedback in this group was erratic. Some companies held one 
or more formal appraisals while others held none. Informal feedback and in-
teraction between superior and subordinate was relatively infrequent. Feed-
back was oriented more towards evaluation than towards employee development. 
Because performance was defined and measured quantitatively and objectively, 
the subordinate manager was not dependent on the superior for feedback. In-
terpretation of performance was not necessary. Results could be understood by 
both parties by examining financial outcomes. 
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The low level of interaction between superior and subordinate and the 
evaluative, as opposed to developmental, approach to feerlback served to empha-
size the subordinate's autonomous role. These characteristics did not express 
concern for the subordinate's development or long-term career progress. The 
reward system was not conducive to a mentoring relationship, nor was it likely 
to contribute to the transference of subtle norms and values. Socialization 
was not an important function of this system. There was no need to communi-
cate a complex set of norms to young managers. 
Bonuses in this system were a very significant part of compensation • 
. Bonus maximums ranged from 40% of salary to "no limit." That is, in some 
firms there was no cap on what a manager could earn in bonus if the financial 
criteria were met. Bonus was based almost exclusively on the performance of 
the division over which the manager had authority. The performance of other 
divisions or the entire corporation, whether better or worse, had almost no 
effect on the individual's bonus. Each division was a profit center and gen-
erated its own bonus pool. An individual's actual bonus payout was determined 
by formula. The resulting figure was rarely altered by superiors, and was 
virtually free of superiors' influence. 
The bonus system communicated that the manager was an independent opera-
tor, not only in terms of superiors, but in terms of other divisions as well. 
The individual's fate was independent of others. There was no economic ra-
tionale for cooperative behavior between different divisional managers. The 
fact that divisions typically competed for corporate resources contributed to 
a competitive relationship between divisional managers. The potentially large 
size of bonuses communicated the value placed on the "star" performer rather 
than the team player. Bonuses were tied to performance rather than to rank. 
This de-emphasized the hierarchy as an important source of rewards. 
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Salary increases and stock awards were indirectly based on managerial 
performance. Salary increases were affected by the external labor market, the 
cost of living, and the manager's overall performance. Stock arrangements 
were frequently negotiated at the time the manager joined the company. These 
rewards were loosely relate-d to performance. Actual amounts of these rewards 
were determined subjectively by superiors. While this contradicts the objec-
tive and distant nature of the system, it expressed the relatively lower value 
placed on these rewards by the organization. Significant performance feedback 
was conveyed in a manager's bonus. It is also possible that superiors operat-
ing under this system needed to have some mechanisms available to them that 
expressed subjective perceptions of subordinate performance. The relative 
flexibility of salary increases and stock awards may have satisfied that 
need. 
Perquisites were almost nonexistent in the performance-based system. 
Symbols of rank and status were not emphasized because the hierarchy itself 
was not emphasized. This communicated a sense of egalitarianism. It ~lso 
lessened the sense of community and uniqueness, however. If reward rituals 
(predicated on tenure and hierarchical position) convey the existence of an 
in-group, then the absence of such rituals weakens the feeling of participa-
tion in a tradition and membership in a special group. 
Promotion in this system was not governed by a norm of promotion from 
within. It was common to find high-ranking managers brought in from the out-
side. Many had been with their companies only a few years. Promotions were 
generally motivated by the organization's need to fill a vacancy rather than 
the individual's need for exposure. Relative to the hierarchy-based system, 
promotion_ occurred infrequently a_nd was usually vertical (i.e., within the 
same division or function) rather than across unit boundaries. 
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The practice of hiring from outside, as opposed to promotion from within, 
conveyed to members that the organization's commitment to them was not neces-
sarily long-term. Individuals could be repeatedly passed over for promotion 
when the organization was able to identify more attractive candidates. These 
organizations were indicating that they did not necessarily value tenure or 
the socialized individual to the extent that they would not consider others 
who did not possess those traits. They also communicated that they did not 
necessarily expect a long-term commitment from their members. These practices 
led to a mutually exploitive relationship. The individual was utilized to 
fill a particular role or perform a particular function, until he or she was 
needed elsewhere or was replaced by a more qualified person. This relation-
ship engendered a similar response from the individual who exploited the orga-
nizationuntil superior benefits were obtainable elsewhere. 
Through the reward system, these organizations also expressed their ex-
pectations concerning desired levels of integration between divisions. Verti-
cal promotions tended to facilitate specialization rather than the movement of 
personnel across divisional boundaries. A wide network of managers who have 
worked together, know each other, and understand each other's responsibilities 
was not fostered. Instead, these promotional practices sent a message of di-
visional independence and uniqueness. These organizations did not seek an in-
tegrated system based on shared language, norms, and goals. 
The performance-based reward system may be summarized in terms of a few 
basic values shown in Table 3. First, the system fundamentally rests on the 
Insert Table 3 About Here 
principle of economic exchange. The individual enters into agreement with the 
organization that certain inputs will be exchanged for certain outcomes 
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according to a carefully defined set of guidelines. The reward system limits 
the relationship between the two parties by specifying exactly the terms of 
exchange. Neither party will go much beyond the specified terms because nei-
ther has any assurance that the other will reciprocate at some future time. 
The existence of a highly detailed contract, in other words, encourages a 
legalistic relationship in which both sides adhere strictly to the contractual 
terms. 
Second, subordinates are highly autonomous in relation to superiors be~ 
cause they are responsible only for the specified financial results. The or-
ganization relinquishes a significant degree of control over the manager's 
methods, style, and so on. It primarily monitors ends rather than the means 
managers employ in achieving them. This also means superiors have reduced 
leverage in influencing the behaviors and values of younger managers. Norms, 
values, and attitudes are more difficult to instill where the subordinate per-
ceives little benefit- from conforming to them. 
Third, the system does not constrain managers by requiring conformity to 
a broad range of norms. This is due to the fact that the evaluation process 
focuses primarily on outcomes, and not on behaviors. There are few behaviors 
governed by norms, values, or implicit expectations. In addition, the overall 
objectivity of the reward system undermines the power of superiors to insist 
that subordinates conform to particular practices. Superiors, usually a crit-
ical source of values and normative influence, play a limited role as mentors 
and role models under this reward system. 
Fourth, the system signals the value of independence rather than interde-
pendence. Individual achievement is rewarded. Little incentive exists for 
sharing lines of information, resources, or personnel. Promotional practices 
reinforce divisional differences*rather than breaking them down. Promotion 
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from outside undermines socialization, cohesion, and group identity. The ab-
sence of perquisites and other company rituals discourages a sense of tradi-
tion and uniqueness. 
Finally, the performance-based system expresses a short-term orientation 
based on mutual exploitation. Quantitative performance criteria make it dif-
ficult to consider actions and decisions from a long-term perspective. The 
contractual nature of the reward system generates an "arm's length" relation-
ship between the organization and individual. This system is not designed to 
foster loyalty or job security. The organization's lack of concern for the 
development and future of members calls forth a similar short-term commitment 
from the individual. Promotion from outside signals to members that they, 
too, must continually weigh the value of external possibilities. Infrequent 
vertical promotions convey that the organization is primarily interested in 
gaining maximum utility from each member rather than developing career paths. 
Market Culture 
Ouchi20 has used the term market to describe a system of control in which 
behaviors are constrained by negotiated terms of exchange that are viewed as 
equitable by the parties involved. This characterization accurately summa-
rizes the culture embedded in the performance-based reward system. 
Table 4 lists the major characteristics of the market culture. In this 
culture, the relationship between individual and organization is contractual. 
Insert Table 4 About Here 
Obligat~ons of each party are specified in advance. The individual is re-
sponsible for some minimum level of performance in return for which the orga-
nization promises to provide a given level of rewards. Increased levels of 
performance are exchanged for increased rewards as specified in a negotiated 
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schedule. Neither party recognizes the right of the other to demand more than 
was originally specified. The organization does not promise (or imply) secu-
rity; the individual does not promise (or imply) loyalty. The contract is re-
newed annually, conditional upon each party adequately performing its obli-
gations. It is utilitarian in that each party uses the other as a means of 
furthering its own goals. Rather than promoting a feeling of membership in a 
social system, the market culture encourages a strong sense of independence 
and individuality in which each participant pursues his or her own interests. 
Contribution to the social system is a means to an end. 
The market culture does not exert a great deal of normative pressure on 
its members. First, the normative structure is lean. Relatively few be-
haviors are governed by norms and values. Members do not share a common set 
of expectations regarding a unique style or philosophy of management. There 
is, therefore, little pressure from peers to conform to specific behaviors or 
attitudes. Superiors maintain an arm's length relationship with subordinates. 
Much of a superiors' interaction with subordinates consists of negotiating 
performance-reward agreements and/or evaluating requests for resource alloca-
tions. A superior's influence on subordinate rewards is limited. This im-
pedes his or her ability to transfer values and norms. Superiors are less ef-
fective as role models or mentors and the absence of long-term commitment by 
both parties weakens the acculturation process. 
Relations between a manager's peers are at arm's length as well. There 
is no obvious economic interdependence, and therefore, no clear rationale for 
cooperation or identification with peers. Managers do not interact frequently 
with counterparts in other divisions and do not develop an extensive network 
of colleagues in the company. Vertical career paths result in little under-
standing of or identification with other divisions. Managers in a market 
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culture view themselves as independent entrepreneurs, rather than as members 
of a cohesive group. There is a sense of individual ownership, with the man-
ager bearing the risks and responsibilities alone. 
The market culture is not designed to generate loyalty, cooperation, or a 
sense of belonging to a social system. Members do not feel constrained by 
norms, values, or allegiance to an accepted way of doing and thinking. It 
does, however, generate personal initiative, a strong sense of ownership and 
responsibility for operations and decisions, and an entrepreneurial approach 
to management. The individual is free to pursue organizational goals with a 
minimum of organizational constraint. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has proposed a framework for developing a typology of organi-
zational cultures on the basis of how reward systems are designed. The under-
lying premise has been that managerial reward systems accurately express many 
of the values, norms, and expectations that comprise an organization's cul-
ture. Reward systems represent visible manifestations of cultures and can 
serve as proxies in the identification of corporate cultures. Reward systems 
define and evaluate performance, and determine and distribute rewards. These 
are overt matnifestations of the values and norms imbedded within the corpora-
tion. 
It is important to recognize that both reward systems and cultures devel-
op within a complex organizational context of strategy, structure, and pro-
cess. A given culture and its associated reward system is neither good nor 
bad, effective nor ineffective, except in terms of its support of the total 
organizational system of which it is part. Both the hierarchy-based and the 
performance-based systems are "performance-based" in the sense that each 
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identifies and rewards a set of more or less complex behaviors. The differ-
ence lies in the cultural values that are expressed through the reward system. 
To the extent these are congruent with strategy, structure, and process, it is 
likely that reward system design will effectively contribute to organizational 
goals. Thus, while the hierarchy-based reward system fosters clan values of 
loyalty, interdependence, and long-term commitment, these mpy comprise an in-
effective culture in an environment that requires innovation, aggressiveness, 
and a strong desire for individual achievement. Similarly, the entrepreneur-
ialism, autonomy, and short-term focus of the market culture may be dysfunc-
tiona! in mature, capital-intensive industries where system-wide integration 
is critical. 
Analysis of the differences between these two cultural types suggests 
there are at least seven basic values that distinguish one culture from 
another. These are illustrated in Table 5. Three values pertain to the 
Insert Table 5 About Here 
-------------------------
individual's relationship with the organization, two pertain to the individ-
ual's relationship with peers, and two pertain to the process by which accul-
turation is accomplished. By determining where an organization falls on each 
dimension, it may be possible to develop a broad profile of its culture. 
Other dimensions of culture may also be identified. A(J.dj..tional dimen,-
sions would provide a richer, more comprehensive framework with which to 
analyze organizational cultures. The resulting cultural types would be more 
accurately detailed, the similarities and differences between - them more ap-
parent. It should then be possible to identify generic cultural types occupy-
ing intermediate positions on the various dimensions, as well as the gross 
distinctions made here. 
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Qualitative criteria, subjective weighting, 
not defined by strategy, not linked to 
rewards; 
Subjective, one or two supervisors, current 
and future time frame; 
One formal session, high dependency on 
superiors, frequent interaction; 
From within, developmental, relatively 
frequent, cross-fertilization; 
Based on corporate performance and position; 
objective and subjective determination; 
20-30% of salary max. 
Based on performance and tenure; 
"objectively" determined; formal salary plan; 
System enforced; status emphasized; 
Subjectively determined. 
Table 2. Characteristics of a Clan Culture 
The relationship between individual and organization: 
1. fraternal relationship 
2. mutual long-term commitment 
3. rests on mutual interests, a shared fate 
4. sense of tradition, history, company, style 
5. hierarchy structures relationship 
The relationship between organization members: 
6. pride in membership 
7. sense of interdependence, identification with peers 
8. extensive collegial network 
9. pressure from peers to conform 
10. stresses collective rather than individual initiative, ownership 
The process of acculturation: 
11. long, thorough socialization 
12. superiors are mentors, role models, agents of socialization 
13. "rich" normative structure governs wide range of behaviors 









Quantitative criteria; objective weighting; 
defined by strategy; clearly linked to 
performance; 
Objective, formulae; current time frame; 
Low dependency on superiors; generally 
infrequent interaction; 
From within and without; organization need; 
infrequent; vertical; 
Based on division performance; objectively 
determined; Max. 40% - No limit; 
Based on indirect performance; subjectively 
determined; 
Non-existent; status de~emphasized; 
Subjectively determined. 
Table 4. Characteristics of a Market Culture 
The relationship between individual and organization: 
1. contractual relationship 
2. mutual short-term commitment 
3. rests on self-interest, utilitarianism 
4. sense of individualism, personal style 
5. terms of exchange structure relationship 
The relationship between organization members: 
6. independence from peers 
7. limited interaction 
8. little pressure from peers to conform 
9. stresses individual initiative, ownership 
The process of acculturation: 
10. little socialization 
11. superiors are distant, negotiators, resource allocato~rs 
12. "lean" normative structure governing few behaviors 
Table 5. Some Basic Dimensions of Culture 
Clan Culture Market Culture 
Values Values 
1. Fraternal Contractual 
Relationship Relationship 
2. Relationshi Based on Relationshi Based 
Mutual Interests on Self-Interest 
3. Lon -term Short-term 
Commitment Commitment 
4. Interdependence Independence 
s. Peer Pressure Low Level of 
Leading to Conformity Peer Pressure 
6. - ~~Ri~·~c~h~N_o_r_m_a_t_i_v_e._ ________________ ~----------------------~L~e-a~n __ N_o_r_m_a_t_i_v_e __ 
Structure Structure 
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Socialization Socialization 
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